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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GARY D. HILFIKER, JR.,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Priority Nc. 3
v.
SCOTT CARVER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,

i

Case No. 960397-CA

Respondent/Appellee.

NATURE OF APPEAL AND JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
This is Hilfiker's appeal from the trial court's denial of his request for
post-conviction relief. The petition challenges his conviction on the grounds that
his attorney was constitutionally ineffective. The supreme court transferred this
appeal under its pour-over authority, giving this Court jurisdiction. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Has Hilfiker overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's
representation was that of a reasonably prudent attorney, within the "wide range
of professional assistance?" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984); State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah App. 1995).

In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny post-conviction relief, this
Court will overturn incorrect legal conclusions without hesitation, but will set
aside "underlying factual findings" only if they are clearly erroneous. Fernandez
v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993). As the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals explained in Parts andElec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec, 866 F.2d
228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988), "to be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as
more than just maybe or probably wrong, it must. . . strike us as wrong with the
force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish."
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Any relevant statutes or rules are included in the text.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
For stabbing his girlfriend in the head 11 times and setting her on fire with
lamp oil, a jury convicted Hilfiker of criminal homicide and aggravated arson on
April 27, 1992 (Crim.R. 444; PCR. 60).x Consequently, the criminal trial court

1

Facts regarding the crime are also taken from the transcripts of the criminal
trial, which are part of the record in this case. Because this case involves the record from two
separate proceedings, Hilfiker's criminal trial and his post-conviction trial, the different
records will be cited as follows: the criminal trial court's record and the criminal trial
transcripts will be referred to as (Crim.R. ); the post-conviction record and transcript will be
referred to as (PCR.
).
2

sentenced defendant to two five-to-life terms at the Utah State Prison (id.).
Through the Salt Lake Legal Defenders' office, Hilfiker appealed his conviction
to this Court, claiming that the criminal trial court should have suppressed his
confession; this Court disagreed and affirmed. State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826
(Utah App. 1994).
Six months later, Hilfiker filed this petition for post-conviction relief,
alleging that his defense attorney at the criminal trial, Candice Johnson, was
constitutionally ineffective (PCR. 1-4). The trial court held an evidentiary
hearing where it heard from Hilfiker, Ms. Johnson, Greg Bown, who prosecuted
the criminal case, and two witnesses called by Hilfiker: Doris Childs and Teresa
Hilfiker (PCR. 104; 215; 223) After hearing evidence, the court rejected
Hilfiker's ineffectiveness claim, denied the requested relief, and dismissed the
petition (PCR. 74).
Statement of Facts

THE EVIDENCE AT THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
A few hours after the victim was found at the burned home, Hilfiker
confessed (Crim.R. 724-25).2 Detective James Alcock, who questioned Hilfiker

2

Hilfiker's confession was taped and then transcribed. The State introduced the
transcription as exhibit 37, part of the record on this appeal.

3

during his confession, read it into the record during the trial and the jury also was
able to read the transcript as an exhibit fid.). Hilfiker admitted that after drinking
alcohol and snorting about a quarter gram of cocaine, he returned to the home he
was sharing with the victim, Marsha Haverty (Crim.R. 726). Ms. Haverty woke
up when he entered and became upset upon learning he was high on cocaine
Gil).
Depressed about other matters, including his unrequited love for a previous
girlfriend and his fear that Ms. Haverty was getting too serious, Hilfiker walked
into the kitchen and got a knife with which he threatened to commit suicide
(Crim.R. 727). Ms. Haverty tried to console him and give him a hug, but
Hilfiker pushed her away, causing her to fall on her back and hurt herself fid.).
Hilfiker stabbed her next to the left eye socket and then, reads the confession,
"everything was a blur" (id.). The next thing he clearly remembered was pulling
the knife out and seeing blood everywhere (id.). In the confession, Hilfiker says:
U

I must have stabbed her. I was the only one in the house. I am not sure how

many times. It is a blur. I don't remember" (Exhibit 37 at 2).
Hilfiker did remember taking an afghan off a couch, placing it on Ms.
Haverty, pouring lamp oil over it, and setting it afire with a Bic lighter (Crim.R.
728-29). Then, his memory again became blurry and he vaguely recalled getting
4

in his car, driving down 7th East and around town before he returned to the
Haverty home, where he pretended distress to the firefighters and police (R. 73033). Suspicious because of inconsistencies in his story and blood on his hands
and clothing, the police eventually took Hilfiker in for questioning where he
finally confessed (Crim.R. 732-734).3
Because defendant confessed to murdering Ms. Haverty, defense counsel
took issue only with defendant's intent (Crim.R. 456). Her goal was to convince
the jury to convict of manslaughter rather than criminal homicide (PCR. 180).
To that end, she called a forensic toxicologist, Dr. Bryan Finkle, who testified
that the combined effect of alcohol and cocaine would be like driving with one
foot on the gas pedal and one on the brake, and a psychologist, Dr. Linda
Gummow, who testified about Hilfiker's mental state (Crim.R. 817; 892). Dr.
Gurnmow stated that Hilfiker had long-standing emotional problems and used
drugs and alcohol abusively (Crim.R. 907-908). Due to the mixture of alcohol
and cocaine, according to Dr. Gummow, Hilfiker was "extremely emotionally
distraught and out of control" the night of the crime, making it unlikely that he
deliberately killed the victim (Crim.R. 920). Rather, she opined, he committed
3

Defense counsel moved to suppress the confession but the trial court denied the
request. On direct appeal, this Court upheld the confession's, admissibility. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d
at 828.
5

the murder "recklessly and secondary to an emotional disturbance that was
exacerbated by drug use" (id.).
Judy Aldous, Hilfiker's former girlfriend, told the jury she had spoken
with him shortly before Ms. Haverty's murder and she believed "everything was
building up on him" (Crim.R. 888). His manager at the Ute Cab company,
David Noker, stated that Hilfiker came to him late on the night before the crime;
he told Noker he was "scared," but did not say why (Crim.R. 877). Hilfiker's
drinking companions the night of the crime saw him consume at least five
alcoholic beverages, including whiskey with coca-cola, whiskey straight, and
tequila straight, and snort about three lines of cocaine (Crim.R. 860; 868). It
was shortly after this that he returned to Ms. Haverty's home for the last time.
EVIDENCE FROM THE POST-CONVICTION HEARING
On the stand, Hilfiker admitted that trial counsel met with him close to ten
times to discuss strategy and evidence (PCR. 107; see also Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law and Order (Addendum A)). During these discussions, she
told him about the maximum potential penalties, but Ms. Johnson did not recall
whether she specifically discussed the potential for consecutive sentences (PCR.
63). Also, Ms. Johnson informed Hilfiker of the State's plea bargain offer, i.e.,
dropping the aggravated arson charge for a plea of guilt to the homicide charge
6

(PCR. 62). At one point, Hilfiker wanted to take the bargain; however, because
he was in tears and obviously upset, trial counsel told him to calm down and
think it through before making a final decision fid.). Eventually, after thinking
through the options, Hilfiker sent a letter to trial counsel thanking her for her
"swell job" and telling her he would not accept a plea bargain unless it was a
"gift horse" (id.).
Either trial counsel or her investigator interviewed all the witnesses
Hilfiker requested, including Doris Childs and Teresa Hilfiker, who took the
stand at the post-conviction hearing (PCR. 64-65). Called as Hilfiker's witness at
the post-conviction hearing, Ms.Childs lived with Hilfiker from November 1986
to April 1987 (id.). Although she stated Hilfiker was never abusive toward her,
she was not aware of his 1991 domestic violence assault charge and agreed that
she was not familiar with his propensity for violence as of 1992 (id.). Ms.
Hilfiker was married to petitioner for three years in the mid-1980s fid.). Like
Ms. Childs, Ms. Hilfiker experienced no abuse during their relationship though
she too was unaware of the 1991 domestic violence charge and her ex-husband's
propensity for violence as of 1992 (PCR. 66).
At trial counsel's request, the criminal trial court instructed the jury on the
lesser included offenses of manslaughter, tampering with evidence, and
7

abuse/desecration of a dead body (PCR. 67). Further, the instructions contained
a charge that voluntary intoxication was a defense if it negated the mental state
required to commit the offense (i*L). Despite these instructions, the jury
convicted Hilfiker of criminal homicide and aggravated arson, the original,
charged offenses.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence from Hilfiker's criminal trial and post-conviction evidentiary
hearing show that his trial counsel acted in a reasonably prudent fashion
throughout her representation. On post-conviction review, Hilfiker lays out five
predicate claims as examples of his counsel's insufficient performance. Because
trial counsel did not actually act inadequately with regard to any of these claims,
Hilfiker's overall claim of ineffectiveness lacks merit.
Hilfiker fails to marshal any evidence regarding his first challenge, i.e., to
his trial counsel's purportedly eliciting negative or inconsistent information from
witnesses either on cross-examination or direct. Except for one witness, Floyd
Pitt, Hilfiker does not name any person who actually testified inconsistently at
trial nor does he set forth that witness' alleged inconsistency. Hilfiker's failure to
establish these basic facts essentially asks this Court to dig through the lengthy
record. Except in capital cases, thi: -ourt is not required to do this job for the
8

appellant and should not do so here. On that basis alone, Hilfiker's first
predicate claim should be discarded. In any event, the actual "inconsistencies,"
if they can be called that, in Mr. Pitts' trial testimony versus his trial statements
to the police are so inconsequential they would have had no effect on the jury's
deliberations even if they had been brought out by trial counsel.
Trial counsel also acted in a reasonably prudent manner in her choice not
to call Hilfiker or two of his requested witnesses, Doris Childs and Teresa
Hilfiker, to the stand. Hilfiker was too emotional, trial counsel recalled, to be
trusted to be a good witness for himself. Ms. Childs and Ms. Hilfiker did not
have any information significant to the issues in the trial because their
involvement with Hilfiker ended in the mid-1980s. Further, at the postconviction hearing, both of these women spoke of Hilfiker's "peaceful"
disposition. Had this information come before the jury, the State could have
brought in evidence of his prior conviction for domestic violence and other bad
acts.
The post-conviction court also properly rejected Hilfiker's claim that trial
counsel did not advise him that the criminal court could, as it eventually did,
sentence him to two consecutive terms. The post-conviction court found that
both trial counsel and the court had told Hilfiker of the maximum potential
9

sentences, even though trial counsel might not have specifically mentioned
consecutive sentences. Thus, Hilfiker had sufficient information to refuse the
offered plea bargain. In any event, post-conviction relief is not available when
the claim is a missed opportunity to plea bargain.
Hilfiker's claim that witness Judy Aldous, during cross-examination,
implied that he had been sent to jail for domestic violence is also off the mark.
Hilfiker admitted during the post-conviction hearing that Ms. Aldous never used
the word jail in his post-conviction testimony. Further, given the context of her
admission that Hilfiker had physically abused her and voluntarily sought help,
trial counsel might have reasonably believed the testimony helped further her
overall trial strategy.
Contrary to Hilfiker's post-conviction allegation, the prosecutor's use of a
styrofoam head was not outside the boundary of permissible conduct courts give
attorneys during closing argument, i.e., to comment on the evidence and
reasonable inferences and deductions. Neither trial counsel nor the court recalled
anything objectionable about the demonstration. Consequently, counsel's
decision not to object was reasonable and prudent.
Finally, Hilfiker mistakenly complains that trial counsel did not use
"diminished capacity" as a defence. The record shows that although trial counsel
10

may not have used that term, her strategy revolved around the concept. Through
testimony of a toxicologist and a psychologist, trial counsel tried to negate the
levels of intent necessary for the jury to find criminal homicide and aggravated
arson. This is a diminished capacity defense and trial counsel implemented it
carefully.
ARGUMENT
NONE OF HILFIKER'S GRIEVANCES ABOUT TRIAL
COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION ARISE FROM
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE;
THEREFORE, HE CANNOT ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL.
In his brief, Hilfiker alleges five instances of deficient performance in trial
counsel's conduct. He argues that these events meet both prongs of the test of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), which requires that trial
counsel's performance fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
the unreasonable performance prejudice the case. Deciding the ultimate question
of counsel's effectiveness turns on the substantive, individual challenges Hilfiker
makes: what might be called his predicate claims.
Obviously, if trial counsel made the right decisions regarding those claims,
her representation met sixth amendment mandates. However, even if counsel's
decisions were not the "right" decisions in retrospect, her representation will not
11

be considered below those mandates unless they cannot be considered "legitimate
strategic choices." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465-66 (Utah App. 1993).
Recognizing that a trial is a difficult, tense, and constantly-changing
environment, courts give trial counsel wide latitude to develop and present cases,
and, therefore, impose a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 689; Tennyson,
850 P.2d at 465. Similarly, "acts or omissions [that] might be considered sound
trial strategy" are immunized from attack. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225
(Utah 1993).
I.

Hilfiker does not state what testimony his counsel elicited
from defense witnesses that conflicted with previous
statements or his confession; therefore, this Court cannot
meaningfully review the challenge and it cannot serve as a
predicate to an ineffective assistance claim.

The first complaint with trial counsel's work is that she obtained testimony
from witnesses that either conflicted with previous statements or contradicted
Hilfiker's confession. Brief of Petitioner at 7. The unstated corollary of this
claim is that these discrepancies harmed Hilfiker's case. However, except for
Floyd Pitts, a witness for the State, Hilfiker fails to present the discrepancies or
name the witnesses whose testimonies conflicted with the alleged previous
statements or the confession. Therefore, it is impossible to evaluate the
12

substance of Hilfiker's claim except for his assertion that Pitts' testimony
contradicted itself and "changed many times." Brief of Petitioner at 7.
Here even, Hilfiker does not explain what particular parts of Pitts'
testimony changed, preventing this Court from conducting any meaningful
review. Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993) (marshaling
provides basis "from which [appellate court can] conduct a meaningful and
expedient review of facts challenged on appeal."). What is remarkable about
Hilfiker's failure to marshal is not that he just fails to compile the evidence in
support of the trial courts findings, but that he fails to compile any evidence at
all. This complete failure asks the Court to speculate about the evidence and dig
through the transcripts on its own. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988) (holding that reviewing court is not a "depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research").
Because Hilfiker has failed to present any evidence supporting his
assertions in compliance with marshaling, this Court should refuse to examine the
claim on the merits. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992).

13

Being thus precluded from review on the merits of this predicate claim, Hilfiker
cannot use this charge as foundation for his ineffectiveness challenge.4
II.

Trial counsel's decision not to call Hilfiker to
the stand and her decision not to call Doris
Childs, Teresa Hilfiker, or Dr. Craig Hyatt
was within the wide range of permissible
discretion courts grant defense counsel in
deciding how to implement trial strategy.

As the post-conviction court stated in its findings, trial counsel called six
witnesses on Hilfiker's behalf, including two experts, a toxicologist and
psychologist (PCR. 69-71; Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order
(Addendum A)). These witnesses stated their observations of Hilfiker's behavior
the night of the crime, his alcohol and cocaine intoxication, and his evident stress
(See Statement of Facts at 6-7). With this evidence, trial counsel showed the jury
a person who was intoxicated, mentally unstable, and extremely emotional. The
goal was to convince the jury that, in the words of Dr. Gummow, the murder of
Marsha Haverty was reckless and not deliberate, that Hilfiker was incapable of

4

Even were this Court to ignore Hilfiker's failure to marshal any evidence, the
post-conviction evidentiary transcript shows that the claimed inconsistencies are
inconsequential and could not have had any effect on the resulting verdict. The
"inconsistencies" included whether Mr. Pitts did or did not follow Ms. Haverty home the
night of the crime and the amount of time Mr. Pitts knew Hilfiker (PCR. 138-39). Neither of
tiiese issues pertain to any of the issues in the criminal trial, i.e., Hilfiker's mental state when
he committed the crime. The State called Pitts merely to identify a jacket found at the burring
home as one he had seen Hilfiker previously wear (Crim.R. 530).
14

forming a deliberate intent due to his intoxication (Crim.R. 920; PCR. 67;
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (Addendum A)).
The failure to reach this goal is not a legitimate criticism of trial counsel's
attempts at it. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989) ("failure to
produce expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel"). Yet,
Hilfiker claims that the addition of his testimony along with three other witnesses
would have brought about his expected result. Brief of Petitioner at 8.
However, he does not say what this testimony would have been other than that it
would have "humanized'' him and "mitigated'' his crime. Id. This again asks
the trial court to do the research and investigation that is Hilfiker's job to do.
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450.
In any event, Hilfiker's assertion that the jury was entitled to hear
"mitigating'' evidence is legally wrong. Brief of Petitioner at 8. In capital cases,
the jury has a sentencing function and a part of the trial is dedicated to establish
either aggravating or mitigating circumstances so that the jury can decide the
appropriate sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1995). Juries in non-capital
cases do not play this role. In fact, the jury here was given an explicit instruction
that prohibited it from considering the sentence in its guilt vs. innocence
determination (Crim.R. 136).
15

Additionally, trial counsel had legitimate reasons not to call Hilfiker to the
stand. Not only was he very emotional, leading her to fear he might hurt his
case, but he also had no other information to give the jury (PCR. 71, Findings of
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (Addendum A); 204-06). Trial counsel
stated her reasons for recommending against testifying in the post-conviction
hearing.
I felt that Gary [Hilfiker] at that time could not help his
case anymore and might hurt his case given his ~ his
feelings about his response during the course of trial. It
was an upsetting situation for him. He had nothing
further to tell the jury that I could imagine. He had to
undergo cross-examination from Mr. Bown. Under
cross-examination, there is always a chance that things
can go wrong for someone. And it was my decision that
basically we had everything that we needed. I would
only recommend that a defendant take the stand if it was
absolutely critical to the defense, there was no
additional information that could be offered or if the
Defendant absolutely insisted on taking the stand. And
if the defendant insisted on taking the stand, I would put
him on the stand. He did not.
(PCR. 187).
Trial counsel was aware of Ms. Children' and Ms. Hilfiker's potential
testimony, which when brought forth at the post-conviction hearing consisted of
their remembrances of Hilfiker from the early-to-mid-1980s as a non-violent
person (PCR. 216-28). Ms. Children lived with Hilfiker for approximately six
16

months; Ms. Hilfiker was married to him for three years (id.). Trial counsel's
decision not to place these women on the stand was legitimate and reasonable.
As the post-conviction court concluded, had any witness "opened the door" by
referring to Hilfiker's peacefulness, the State could have introduced his prior
conviction and other "bad acts" (PCR. 71; Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law
and Order (Addendum A)).
Further, neither witness, according to trial counsel, had significant other
information to disclose that would have been helpful to the case (PCR. 174-76).
Under these circumstances, the decision not to call either Ms. Children or Ms.
Hilfiker was reasonable. See State v. Huggins, 294 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah
App. filed July 1996) (where suggested witnesses would not have contributed
significant information and could have opened the door to prior convictions, trial
counsel's decision not to call them was appropriate). Trial counsel's choice of
witnesses was one any reasonably prudent attorney would have taken. It was
designed to persuade the jury to convict of lesser-included offenses and minimize
potential damage to the overall case (PCR. 67 (Findings of Fact Conclusions of
Law and Order (Addendum A)).

17

HI.

Trial counsel gave Hilfiker sufficient information for
him to make a proper decision about the plea
bargain, which, in any event, is not a legitimate basis
for post-conviction relief; therefore, trial counsel did
not perform inadequately.

Before the criminal trial, the State offered Hilfiker a plea agreement that
would require him to plead guilty to the homicide charge in exchange for
dismissal of the aggravated arson charge (PCR. 62, Findings of Fact Conclusions
of Law and Order (Addendum A)). At one point, Hilfiker told trial counsel he
wanted to accept the offer but, because he was very emotional then, she asked
him to wait before making a decision (id.).
Eventually Hilfiker told trial counsel, via a letter he sent through Doris
Children, that he would not accept a plea bargain unless it was a "gift horse"
(PCR. 63). On post-conviction review, the trial court construed this statement as
indicating that Hilfiker would plead only to a lesser-included offense, such as
manslaughter and would no longer accept the State's offer (id.). Hilfiker now
claims trial counsel did not let him know that, if he went to trial and was
convicted of both first-degree felonies, he could be sentenced consecutively.
Brief of Defendant at 9. Thus, asserts Hilfiker, he was inadequately advised
about the risks of refusing the bargain.
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After the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court
rejected this allegation, finding that trial counsel and the criminal trial court had
discussed the maximum penalties for each offense with Hilfiker (PCR. 69,
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order (Addendum A)). Thus, although
trial counsel might not have specifically mentioned the possibility of consecutive
sentences, Hilfiker had enough information to make an informed refusal of the
State's offer (id.). Hilfiker again does not marshal die evidence in support of this
finding. Therefore, this Court assumes it is adequately supported by the record
and proceeds to the resulting legal conclusion. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d
818, 820 (Utah App. 1992). The post-conviction court ruled that counsel's
representation was within the wide range of professional assistance and, thus, not
grounds for an ineffectiveness claim (PCR. 72, Findings of Fact Conclusions of
Law and Order (Addendum A)).
This ruling is correct. "[The] state and federal constitutions guarantee fair
trials, not plea bargains." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987)
(citing State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). Therefore, even if trial
counsel's representations to Hilfiker regarding the plea were open to question,
post-conviction relief simply is not available to remedy a criminal defendant's
failure to accept a plea bargain. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 515, 519 (Utah
19

1994) (habeas relief available where defendant has suffered a "substantial and
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right:); Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,
991 (Utah 1993) (relief via post-conviction available only to remedy "substantial
denial of a constitutional right").
IV.

Contrary to Hilfiker's assertion, Judy Aldous did not
imply that he went to jail for abusing her or was ever
convicted for domestic violence; in any event,
information that he voluntarily sought help for this
problem was harmless error, if error at all.

Hilfiker argues that, on cross-examination, Judy Aldous implied that he
was sent to jail because of physical abuse. Brief of Defendant at 9. Trial counsel
called Ms. Aldous to testify to the stress Hilfiker was experiencing the days
before the murder (Crim.R. 888). During cross-examination, the prosecutor
asked Ms. Aldous if Hilfiker had ever physically abused her (id.). She admitted
abuse but also stated that Hilfiker recognized the problem and voluntarily called
the police and "asked for help" (Crim.R. 890). Contrary to Hilfiker's current
claim, Ms. Aldous never stated he was sent to jail or convicted for domestic
violence; irdeed, Hilfiker admitted this at the evidentiary hearing (PCR. 156).
Ms. Aldous' statements provide no reasonable grounds for Hilfiker's
assertion +v,at they implied he was jailed or convicted. They do not conflict with
d.° ^i2-v i order suppressing Hi'. ,cer's prior convictions (Crim.R. 69-70).
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Also, given that Ms. Aldous provided evidence of a repentant Hilfiker, trying to
control his emotions and violence, a reasonably prudent attorney may have
decided not to object on the reasonable belief that it would help her overall theory
of no deliberate intent. State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995)
(depending on circumstances, refusing to object may be a legitimate trial
strategy).
In any event, this testimony did not prejudice Hilfiker's case. To show
this, Hilfiker would need establish a reasonable possibility that, but for the
evidence, the outcome of the trial would have ended more favorably, i.e., in a
verdict for lesser-included offenses. Huggins, 294 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. On
balance with the rest of the evidence, the information Ms. Aldous gave the jury
was not of such significance that it alone would have swayed the jury's vote.
Therefore, neither Ms. Aldous' testimony nor trial counsel's decision not to
object to it was ineffective.
V.

The prosecutor's use of the styrofoam head during
closing argument was not out-of-line to such an
extent that trial counsel was constitutionally
obligated to object.

In his transcribed confession, admitted at the trial and read into evidence,
Hilfiker claimed he had cut his hand on the window while trying to get into the
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burning home (Exhibit 37 at 13). During closing argument, the prosecutor
attacked this claim, using a styrofoam model head to show the jury how the
cutting could have happened and the force required to do so (Crim. R. 660-61).
From the prosecutor's remarks, his display was intended to show that Hilfiker
had used deliberate rather than reckless action.
Showing you this Styrofoam head, showing you the
murder weapon. How could he cut his hand? Well,
blood's all over the place; blood's slippery. It is on the
handle. We know his blood is on the handle, and her
blood is all over the place....There is this z-shaped
wound where a chip of blood ~ a chip of bone was
actually taken from the skull. What would happen if
there is a blow and it chips? It stops in the bone. It
chips and stops. What happens with a slippery object
(Indicating)? It cuts your hand. That's how it
happened.
Id.
Neither trial counsel nor the court intervened (R. 72). The demonstration
appears to have been reasonably based on the "evidence ?nd the inferences and
deductions arising therefrom." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah
1989) (holding that counsel have wide latitude in closing arguments to discuss
evidence). During the post-conviction hearing, Hilfiker and his two witnesses,
Doris Children and Teresa Hilfiker, stated the jury appeared to be "shocked" by
the display (PCR. 71; Findings zf Fact Conclusions of' -w and Order
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(Addendum A)). Nevertheless, the post-conviction court was within its discretion
to believe instead the testimony of the criminal trial counsel who found nothing
objectionable (PCR. 208; PCR. 72 (Addendum A)). Trial counsel's decision not
to object to the closing argument was a reasonably prudent one (id.).
VI.

Hilfiker's complaint that trial counsel did not present
evidence of "diminished capacity" should be rejected
because it is factually incorrect; Hilfiker's alleged
inability to form a deliberate intent due to
intoxication was the centerpiece of trial counsel's
strategy and it was well implemented.

Because his confession severely limited trial counsel's options, her defense
of Hilfiker rested on persuading the jury that his intoxication negated his ability
to form the intentional or knowing "intent" needed to establish criminal
homicide (PCR. 191; 67, Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order). This
is a "diminished capacity" defense. "Appropriate testimony showing that
defendant's intoxication negated the existence of the mental state which is an
element of the offense would be a form of evidence bearing on diminished mental
capacity." State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 857 n.24 (Utah App. 1992).
Though trial counsel did not use the term "diminished capacity," that concept
was the keystone of her strategy and she implemented it with the testimony of Dr.
Gummow, Dr. Finkle and the non-expert witnesses who testified to Hilfiker's
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heavy use of alcohol and cocaine. Hilfiker was in total agreement with this
strategy (PCR. 68, Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order).
Dr. Gummow stated that due to the combined use of alcohol and cocaine,
together with his general emotional state, she did not believe Hilfiker could have
killed the victim deliberately (Crim.R. 920). Trial counsel argued Hilfiker's
mental state extensively in closing, commenting on his intoxication and his
general emotional state as well as on Dr. Gummow's testimony (Crim.R. 10191021).5 Trial counsel also requested and received an instruction on voluntary
intoxication and "extreme emotional disturbance," along with the lesser-included
offense instructions, which she also argued at closing (Crim.R. 1024; PCR. 131).
Trial counsel relied on Hilfiker's intoxication to negate the necessary intent for
both crimes. Just because the defense was not successful does not render trial
counsel ineffective.
5

Hilfiker cites to two letters in his "supplemental record" from Dr. Gummow
that indicate trial counsel did not use evidence of "diminished capacity." These letters are not
appropriately part of the record. On April 12, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court ordered the
district court clerk to supplement the post-conviction record with the criminal trial record
(attached as Addendum B). This is the only supplementation order in this case. Dr.
Gummow's letters were not before the criminal court or the post-conviction court. Therefore,
pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, these letters, and all Hilfiker's
purported "supplemental record" should be stricken.
Nevertheless, Dr. Gummow's letters are not significant. Given the evidence and
argument trial counsel actually used at trial, Dr. Gummow simply seems confused about the
various ways the concept "diminished capacity" can be used without ever using the term.
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None of Hilfiker's grievances rise to the level of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Because of the confession and the nature of the crime, trial counsel's
options were limited to persuading the jury to accept lesser-included offenses
(PCR. 67, Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order). Trial counsel
discussed this strategy with Hilfiker who "supported it enthusiastically until it
produced an unfavorable verdict." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 76 (Utah App.
1990). Hilfiker cannot establish deficient performance in any aspect of trial
counsel's representation.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the post-conviction court's denial of Hilfiker's
requested relief and the dismissal of his petition.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ^3/tVday of September 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARY D. HILFIKER, JR.,

v,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 940903984 HC

Petitioner,

Respondent,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

The above-captioned matter came before the Court on June 2122,

1995

for

an

evidentiary

hearing

on

the

petition

for

extraordinary re'iief pursuant to rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Petitioner was present and was represented by Dean C.

Andreasen.

Respondent was represented by Angela F. Micklos and

David E. Yocom, Assistant Attorneys General.

After reviewing the

file in this matter and in the underlying criminal mafsr, and

after hearing oral testimony and counsel's arguments, the Court now
enters the following.

FINPINSS OF FACT
1»

On April 27, 1992, petitioner was charged by information

with criminal homicide, a first degree felony, and aggravated
arson, a first degree felony.

After a jury trial on November 10-

14, 1992, petitioner was convicted of both counts. On December 14,
1992, the trial court sentenced petitioner to serve five-years-tolife on each count, to run consecutively.
2.

On April 29, 1992, Candice Johnson entered her appearance

of counsel and a request for discovery on petitioner's behalf,
3.

Ms. Johnson m£t often with petitioner in the jail from

May 1992 until the time of trial in November 1992.

During one of

Ms. Johnson's visits with petitioner at the jail prior to the
preliminary hearing, Ms. Johnson discussed with petitioner a
possible plea agreement that they could seek from the prosecutor.
Ms.

Johnson told petitioner that

they could

request

a plea

agreement which would allow petitioner to plead to manslaughter, a

2

second degree felony, and destruction of evidence, a third degree
felony.
4.

The

only plea

agreement

offered

by

the prosecutor

provided that the aggravated arson charge would be dismissed if
petitioner pled to the first degree murder count as charged.
Johnson discussed the plea agreement with petitioner.

Ms.

Petitioner

was very upset and stated that he just wanted to plead and get
things over with. Ms. Johnson testified that she would never allow
a client to plead guilty in such a distraught state of mind and,
that therefore, she advised petitioner to think it over and told
petitioner that she would discuss the matter with him again when he
was thinking more clearly.
5«

Ms. Johnson's advice to petitioner to postpone deciding

whether he wanted to plead guilty until he was thinking more
clearly was sound and rational.
6.

During her discussions with petitioner regarding the plea

agreement, Ms. Johnson

informed petitioner that

he would be

pleading to a first degree felony which carried a penalty of fiveyears-to-life at the prison.

Ms. Johnson also informed petitioner

3

that she would try to get second and third degree convictions at
trial#

which would carry a 1-15 year and 0-5 year penalty,

respectively. Ms. Johnson has no specific memory of discussing the
possibility of consecutive sentences, but she did discuss the
maximum penalties for each offense.

Ms. Johnson told petitioner

that he would definitely go to prison and that the only issue was
for how long.
?•

Petitioner made the ultimate decision whether to accept

the plea agreement or to proceed to trial.

Ms. Johnson did not

coerce petitioner into going to trial.
8.

On October 14, 1992, petitioner sent Ms. Johnson a letter

thanking her for the "swell job" that she was doing and stating
that he would not accept a plea agreement unless it was a "gift
horse." The rational implication of petitioner's statement is that
he would only accept a plea bargain to manslaughter or another
lesser offense.
9.

On December 15, 1992, petitioner, through his friend,

Doris Childs, sent Ms. Johnson a card thanking her for all that she
had done on petitioner's behalf.
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10.

Prior to petitioner's decision to proceed to trial, Ms.

Johnson received all discoverable information from the prosecutor's
file and personally viewed all of the physical evidence with the
prosecutor, Greg Bown.
11.

To the best

of her knowledge, Ms. Johnson, either

personally or through her investigator, Dennis Couch, spoke to all
of the potential witnesses that petitioner asked her to contact.
Specifically, Ms. Johnson testified that either she or Mr. Couch
spoke to:
a.

Dave Noker, petitioner's employer who testified at
trial;

b.

Brian Singer, a bartender who testified at trial;

c.

Gary Freer, petitioner's friend who testified at
trial;

d.

Judy Aldous, petitioner's former girlfriend who
testified at trial;

e.

All of petitioner's neighbors who were interviewed
by the police;

f.

Debbie conses, a friend of the victim, Marsha
Haverty;

g.

Teresa Hilfiker, petitioner's ex-wife;

h.

Doris Childs, petitioner's friend; and
5

i.

12.

Elaine Densley, a friend of the victim, Marsha
Haverty.

Petitioner testified that he wanted Ms. Johnson to call

as witnesses: Teresa Hilfiker, Doris Childs, and Dr. Craig Hyatt
(Ms. Haverty's son's psychologist).
13.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Doris Childs

testified that she dated petitioner for approximately six months
from November 1986 until April 1987.

Ms. Childs testified that

during their relationship, petitioner never physically abused her
or used physical force.

Ms. Childs acknowledged that she was not

aware that petitioner was charged in 1991 with a domestic violence
assault and that as of 1992, she had no current knowledge regarding
petitioner's propensity for violence; Ms. Childs' knowledge of
petitioner's character was based on her six-month relationship with
petitioner in 1986-87.
14.

At

the

post-conviction

evidentiary

hearing

Teresa

Hilfiker, petitioner's ex-wife, testified that she was married to
petitioner from 1984-1987.

Ms. Hilfiker testified that during

their marriage, petitioner never assaulted or physically abusedAer. ffltt
Ms. Hilfiker acknowledged that she was not aware that petitioner
6

was charged in 1991 with a domestic violence assault and that as of
1992,

she

had

no

current

knowledge

regarding

petitioner's

propensity for violence•
15.

Petitioner was also represented by Leshia Lee-Dixon, who,

entered her appearance as co-counsel on October 8# 1992. Ms. LeeDixon's

role

in this case was

limited primarily

to opening

statement, cross-examination of some police witnesses, preparing
Dr. Finkle, and legal research.

Petitioner has not challenged Ms.

Lee-Dixon's effectiveness.
16.

Petitioner confessed to the police that he stabbed Marsha

Haverty and subsequently poured kerosene over her and set her on
fire.

In addition

to petitioner's

confession,

there was a

significant amount of blood evidence which incriminated petitioner.
17.

Ms. Johnson filed a motion to suppress petitioner's

confession.
confession

The trial court denied the motion to suppress the
but

granted

Ms.

Johnsons'

motion

to

suppress

petitioner's prior convictions1.

Petitioner was convicted of burglary in 1978, aggravated
burglary in 1979, and attempted theft in 1982. Additionally,
petitioner was charged in 1990 with soliciting sex and in 1991 with

7

18.

In light of the evidence against petitioner, Ms. Johnson

determined that the only sound trial strategy was to convince the
jury that petitioner was guilty only of lesser included offenses
because he lacked the requisite mental state for the first degree
felonies.

In Ms. Johnson's professional opinion, petitioner's

confession

severely

limited

available

defense

theories

and

convinced her to pursue a manslaughter conviction based upon
petitioner's cocaine and alcohol consumption.
19.

The jury was instructed on the following lesser included

offenses:

manslaughter,

tampering

with

evidence,

and

abuse/desecration of a dead human body. Additionally, the jury was
instructed that voluntary intoxication is a defense if it negates
the mental state required to commit the offense(s).
20.

In

petitioner
remembered.

preparing

to write

her

trial

theory,

Ms.

down any details of

the

Johnson
crime

asked

that he

Petitioner indicated to Ms. Johnson that he had been

drinking and ingesting cocaine on the night of the murder and that

a domestic violence assault.
unlisted.

The disposition for these charges is
8

ftnnnft7

he did not recall actually stabbing Ms, Haverty, but remembered
pulling the knife out of her body and subsequently lighting her
body on fire.

Petitioner also indicated to Ms. Johnson that he

remembered leaving the house after starting the fire said returning
a short time afterward.
21.

Ms. Johnson discussed with petitioner the trial strategy

and petitioner indicated to Ms. Johnson that he was in total
agreement with the defense theory.
22.

Ms. Johnson called the following defense witnesses in

support of the trial theory:
a.
toxicologist,

Dr. Bryan Finkle, a well-recognized and respected
who testified

that

cocaine

and

alcohol

affect

different parts of the brain, and that taking both substances at
the same time is like driving with one foot on the gas pedal and
one foot on the brake pedal at the same time.
b.

Dr. Linda Gummow, a psychologist who had met with

petitioner on two occasions for two-and-a-half hours each session
and had reviewed the autopsy reports, blood reports, police
statements, and legal statutes.
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Dr. Gummow testified that if

petitioner had been intoxicated from alcohol and cocaine, it would
not have been unusual for him to forget specific details of the
crime.

Dr. Gummow also testified that although petitioner did not

meet the legal definition of mentally ill, petitioner could not
have formed the intent to kill Ms. Haverty.

Dr. Gummow testified

that petitioner acted recklessly due to the cocaine and alcohol
use, combined with his emotional disturbance.
c.

Brian Singer, a bartender who testified about the

number of drinks petitioner had at Charlies' Bar on the night of
the murder.
d.

Gary Frear, a man who used to shoot darts with

petitioner at Charlies', testified that he saw petitioner at the
bar around 6:00 or 6:30 the evening of the murder.

Mr. Frear

testified that petitioner had approximately five drinks and snorted
a white powdery substance on three different occasions outside in
the bar parking lot (approximately 9:30 p.m., 11:00 p.m., and 12:30
a.m.) on the night of the murder. Mr. Frear further testified that
petitioner left Charlies' at approximately 1:30 a.m. and that
petitioner still had some white powdery substance in his bag.

10

e.

David Noker# the manager at Ute Cab Company, and

petitioner's former boss.

Mr. Noker testified that petitioner

liked to drink quite a bit and that on the Tuesday prior to the
murder, petitioner seemed distraught and attempted after work to
discuss (with Mr. Noker) his emotional problems.
f.

Judy

Aldous,

petitioner's

former

girlfriend,

testified that she dated petitioner off and on for six years and
that petitioner drank to excess too often and used cocaine when he
drank.

Ms. Aldous also testified that on one occasion, petitioner

physically abused her, however it was petitioner who called the
police and stated that he needed help.
23.

Ms* Johnson discussed many times with petitioner, the

option of petitioner testifying on his own behalf.

In fact, Ms.

Johnson prepared petitioner to testify. However, after the defense
witnesses had testified/ Ms. Johnson told petitioner that all of
the necessary evidence had come in through other witnesses and that
in her professional opinion, petitioner's testimony was not needed,
and that petitioner could in fact hurt his case by testifying.
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24.

If either petitioner or other character witnesses had

testified regarding petitioner's peacefulness or lack of violence,
petitioner would have opened the door for the prosecutor to attempt
to impeach petitioner with petitioner's prior convictions and bad
acts.

Petitioner would have been prejudiced if the jury had heard

about petitioner's prior acts of violence.
25.
numerous

Petitioner's case was thoroughly presented through the
defense

witnesses,

which

bolstered petitioner's defense theory.

included

two

experts

who

It was appropriate for Ms.

Johnson to advise petitioner not to take the stand since all the
necessary evidence had already been admitted.
26.

Petitioner made the ultimate decision, after receiving

Ms. Johnson's professional opinion, to refrain from testifying on
his own behalf.

Ms. Johnson did not prevent petitioner from

testifying.
27.

At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Ms. Childs

and Ms. Hilfiker testified that during his closing argument, the
prosecutor, Greg Bown, repeatedly stabbed a styrofoam head and that
the jury appeared to be shocked.
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28.

Neither Ms. Johnson nor Mr. Bown recalled the use of the

styrofoam head during closing argument. Ms. Johnson testified that
she did not see anything objectionable about Mr. Bown's closing
argument and would have objected to anything prejudicial.
29.

If Mr. Bown's closing argument had been exaggerated or

prejudicial, the court would have interceded.

Mr. Bown's closing

argument was within reasonable bounds.
30.

Ms. Johnson's representation of petitioner was very

thorough and professional and within the wide range of reasonably
competent assistance.
31.

Petitioner does not have a constitutional right to be

informed of all the possible ramifications of going to trial.
Nevertheless, petitioner failed to demonstrate that had Ms. Johnson
advised him differently, he would have insisted upon accepting the
plea agreement.
32.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that had Ms. Johnson

called certain character witnesses at trial, or cross-examined the
State's witnesses differently, or objected to Mr. Bown's closing
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argument, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would
have been different.
33.
trial,

Since Ms. Johnson effectively represented petitioner at
petitioner's

appellate

counsel,

Joan

Watt,

was

not

ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal, the issue of Ms.
Johnson's ineffectiveness.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner

preponderance

of

the

has

the

burden

evidence,

the

of

satisfying,

standard

of

by

a

ineffective

assistance of counsel announced in Strickland v, Washington. 466
U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

Therefore, petitioner must demonstrate both

that: specific acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of
professionally

competent

assistance;

and

counsel's

deficient

performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding.
2.

Petitioner has failed to meet either prong of the

Strickland standard.
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ORDER
Base on the foregoing, the Court now ORDERS as follows:
1.

The relief requested in the petition is denied.

2.

The petition iB dismissed on the merits with prejudice.

DATED this

0 —'gav of

Third District Court

Approved as to form:

Dean C. Andreasen
Attorney for petitioner
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CERTIFICATE VF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was mailed,

2£_ day of July, 1995 to:

postage prepaid, this r>\

Dean C. Andreasen
CAMPBELL MAACR & SESSIONS
Attorneys for petitioner
201 S. Main St., Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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B

ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229)

FILED

ORIGINAL

Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee
P.O. Box 140854
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

APR 1 2 1996
r , P n i r O M D D C ^ ~~.
C L E R K SU
™™E COURT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GARY D. HILFIKER, JR.,

:

ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT THE
RECORD

v.

:

Case No. 950486

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Petitioner/Appellant.

Respondent/Appellee. :
Pursuant to appellee's motion and good cause appearing, the Court
ORDERS the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, to supplement the
record in Gary D. Hilfiker. Jr. v. State of Utah. 940903984 HC, with the record in State of
Utah v. Gary D. Hilfiker. Jr.. 921900991. The clerk is directed not to re-paginate the record
in case number 921900991, but should reference case number 921900991 as a single
volume supplement to the record in case number 940903984 HC.
DATED this I * "

day of April, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

